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**Transformation of the
International Order:
What After Unipolarity?**

Professor DEJAN JOVIĆ

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Dejan Jović

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Jazbina 159, 10 000 Zagreb, Republic of Croatia

fvp.forum@gmail.com

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Transformation of the International Order: What After Unipolarity?

Dejan Jović, Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb, President of the Governing Board of the Foreign Policy Forum

Let me first explain the main concepts that I will use in this lecture. These are the concepts of "transformation", "international order", and "unipolarity", and in a broader sense – with regard to the alternatives to unipolarity – the terms bipolarity, multipolarity or non-polarity. Although they are used loosely, and in this use in public discourse they acquire various meanings – as well as lose clarity – many books have been written on each of these concepts. For those of us who are professionally involved in international relations, international order and foreign policies, these are fundamental concepts.

The term "transformation" is used here to describe the process of continuous changes that create new forms from the same material. It is the reshaping of something, with the awareness that perhaps those who reshape do not have a vision of the final or even desirable form at all, or that the vision they have is secondary to the need to react to the visions and actions of others, and to protect their own national interests. They do not expect matter itself to disappear, nor for us to abandon it as spent, unfashionable or unnecessary – for example, so that the international order disappears and is replaced by a permanent state of anarchy. It is a continuous dynamic interaction, in which – in this case – states participate, but also other actors: international security networks, international organizations, multinational corporations, international media, global trade processes, etc. There is no – and never will be – agreement among them about what they want to change and how. Ideas and interests, goals and manners in which individual actors want to transform the existing situation into something new constantly collide. Actors – including states – often making mistakes in relation to their own self-proclaimed objectives. Sometimes, they act violently when they conclude that they cannot achieve their objectives in other ways.

If transformation is more organized and planned, we talk about transition. The transition at least has a clear beginning, if not a clear end. It begins when the old order can no longer be maintained, and the new one cannot yet be established. Unlike transformation, which is continuous and rather unpredictable, transition is usually limited in duration. It lasts from the beginning of the end of the old order to the end of the beginning of the new. To be successful, it must involve the transfer of power from the hands of the old elites to the hands of the new ones. In order for this transfer to be organized and peaceful, non-violent, it is necessary to create a transition pact. Such a pact must be created by moderate forces of the old order and moderate forces of the new order. Their main task is to marginalize the extremists on both sides. Moderate politicians of the old order must be capable to prevent extreme (radical) politicians of the old order from using violence to prevent the transition of power. At the same time, the moderate politicians of the new ruling forces must be able to prevent the extremists (revolutionaries) in the new elite, in order to prevent revenge and bloodshed after the changes take place. Each bloodshed creates new, deep and permanent divisions, thus making it impossible to stabilize the new order.

The changes we see in contemporary international relations look more like transformation than transition. The outlines of the new world are not yet visible, but the prevailing belief is that the old one can no longer be sustained. Moreover, it seems that the situation will last a long time, that it will not end soon.

For example, writing in the magazine *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* last year on the transformation of the international order, Mehdi Sanaei concludes that a long

interim period is ahead of us, in which the old order will be weakened but will continue to exist, and a new one will not be formed.

The last time there was a change in the character of the international order - and that was with the end of the Cold War - it was still more about transition than about transformation (in the sense in which I have described it here). The old, bipolar, order collapsed quickly, primarily due to the suicidal collapse of the Soviet Union and then the dissolution of its main instrument for maintaining power in Europe: the Warsaw Pact. The speed with which it happened caught many, including Western countries, by surprise. At one point, it even seemed that the West was worried about the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and Eastern Europe. The West was not ready for the end of the Cold War - so, for example, it did not act as expected in the new circumstances, by dissolving NATO and withdrawing from Europe. This, as we see today, was one of the reasons for the renewal of the idea of bipolarity in Europe, through opposition to NATO, primarily by Russia - admittedly not immediately, not during Yeltsin's time, and not even at the very beginning of Putin's rule in Russia, but only after the first serious crises of the liberal order, which was proclaimed with the thesis that liberalism and democracy "have no alternative" because even in the world of ideas it is not possible to even imagine a better, different world. That, it turned out, was an illusion. History has no end, and it never stops. The key moment of that transformation - from the order that Charles Krauthammer in 1990 called the "unipolar moment", towards something new, post-unipolar - was Putin's speech at the Munich conference in 2007.

Unfortunately, the unexpected and rapid transition that occurred in 1989 also created a moment of chaos and anarchy, in which Southeastern Europe, or the Balkans, suffered particularly. In it, not only did Yugoslavia collapse, as well as its main multinational

republics (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia), but the new global hegemon hesitated to perform the role that was assigned to it - the role of a guarantor of security and stability. Many paid for this hesitation with their lives in the period from 1991 to 1995, and later - until 1999. An unexpected and unprepared transition, therefore, can leave deep and tragic consequences. This is a lesson that we should have learned from the past situation - so that it does not happen again. The consequences of the collapsing of the old international order are not the same for all countries. On the peripheries, at the points of contact of previous spheres of interest and spheres of power, there are greater risks of creating a gap through which countries can sink into violence and instability. For these countries, it is especially important that the transition is done in an orderly manner, in order to establish a new order that could ensure peace when the states cannot or do not want to.

I also mentioned the concept of "international order". That order is never as solid or as stable as the domestic political order, simply because there is no world state. Realists in international relations even hesitate to use it, speaking rather about the international arena - not about the order. And indeed, even in the bipolar system of the Cold War, there were also third powers, as well as zones where bipolarism was not present. Bipolarism was not as solid and solid as described in the theory. The existence of the Third World, the functioning of a group of non-aligned and neutral countries (even in Europe), the existence of non-aligned states, or of rogue states, those that pursued their own ideological and religious projects (e.g., through the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979) - all of these were manifestations of a departure from bipolarity. And even while it lasted, conflicts arose within alliances dominated by the hegemon, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Even in the era of the “unipolar moment,” there was no perfect unipolarism or hegemony of just one power—the United States. By using the word “moment” to describe the new state of affairs, realists essentially acknowledged that unipolarity would not last forever. A unipolar power always invites (or provoke) others to resist and unite to establish equilibrium by forming a counter-power. The rise of anti-Americanism in the world in the 2000s, whether by Russia or China, or by Islamic movements and similar anti-Western attempts—shows that opposition to the world hegemon cannot be stopped. Although the United States was the most powerful in its and world history during that period, the strongest unipolarity existed during that period in Europe, where the European Union became a powerful unipolar hegemon, preventing all alternatives.

This leads me to define the term "polarity". What are the poles in international relations? Poles are forms of organization of international relations shaped by great powers that establish their order, promoting not only their values as the only ones to be protected, but also creating institutions, rules and customs, conventions and other forms of international law, which become obligatory for all those included in their "pole". Poles are forms of organizing both hard and soft and smart power. They are institutions of territorial control, and forms of connecting similar countries in order to become more powerful in the international arena. Only great powers can organize the poles. However, not all great powers try to organize the poles, or even organizations such as pacts and alliances around them. Some countries consider alliances and pacts unnecessary or even harmful to their national interests. They prefer to act unilaterally, alone - or, when they need allies, through ad hoc, temporary and unstructured coalitions (for example: "coalitions of the willing") to act in a specific case, that is, in a specific military or political action. Great powers are powerful because

can decide for themselves when alliances are beneficial and when they are harmful. They sometimes find that grand strategies are also sometimes limiting. As Henry Kissinger once said - America is not powerful because it has a grand strategy, but because it has great power. It may decide for itself when and what it will ignore and tolerate - and what it will not. It has the ability to intervene when it wants to and not to intervene when it deems it more convenient.

Today, we live in an era of intense transformation of the international order, which looks more like non-order or even disorder - chaos without rules, in a era of marginalization of existing alliances and customs, rather than the institutionalization of a strategy or even a vision of the future order. This is exactly what creates uncertainty and insecurity, in which small countries that have neither the ability nor the ambition to shape the international order themselves often do not find their way, and in which they feel unprotected and threatened. They try to get out of the chaos, so as not to suffer the negative consequences of the transformation, but at the same time they ask themselves - what will the future order look like, who will decisively shape it and how to adapt to the future order? They ask themselves first of all: will the new order be a new unipolarism, or bipolarism or multipolarism or a non-polar order?

There is no agreement on these issues either in the political or academic sphere. As written in the already mentioned Sanaei's article, one of the possibilities is a return to unipolarism, in which the American power would continue to be decisive and enormous. William Kindred Winecoff thus - in an article published in 2020 in the European Journal of International Relations - claims that the idea of the "lost hegemony" of the USA is actually a myth. He explains this thesis by the fact that the military, media, financial and political power of the USA and the West in general is still unquestionably

large and sufficient to shape the behavior of all other actors. Other authors, such as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth (in an article in *Foreign Affairs* (2016)) dispute the idea that China will overtake the US in any of these respects. China, moreover, shows no desire to form its own alliances or impose its own values on others in the world. Russia – particularly with its war against Ukraine – has weakened its position to the point where it is much harder to be a friend of Russia today than it was before 2014 or even before 2022. It has remained a “spoiler” power”, capable of disturbing or disrupting the US and the West, but not of establishing its own alternative order.

This assessment, however, is not shared by some of the leading theorists of international order, such as the (now deceased) Kenneth Waltz and Zbigniew Brzezinski, or John Ikenberry. They do see the rise of alternative powers, however, pointing to the global rise of China, as well as India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia, which are becoming powerful regional powers. There is also Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others - which behave quite independently. Turkey is a particularly interesting case - a country that is in NATO and often behaves differently from the USA in issues that are important to it, such as Syria or Iran. Let's remember Ahmet Davutoglu and his book "Strategic Depth", in which he promotes Turkey as a regional power that should stop being a pendant of the USA and must become the most influential country in the so-called Afro-Eurasia. In such countries, turning to oneself has the function of raising one's status. This is possible only by forming the so-called megaregions, regions that an aspiring great power forms with the desire to influence them. And then, of course, there is the European Union, which today realizes that it will have to further emancipate itself from the US: either because it wants to or because the US is moving away from it. I will say more about this later in this lecture.

Some of these authors claim that a new bipolar world is being created - where China rises above the others and everyone associates with it. The rest are weak, quarreling with each other or even at war. Those who are convinced of a bipolar future of the world talk about the division into West and the Rest, and indicate that the real winner of the wars in Ukraine and Iran will be – China, or – in a broader sense – Asia and Africa. They announce that the 21st century will become the century of the East, with Russia not belonging to the East but located between the West and the East.

Those who enter wars weaken their position - because it is easier to start a war than to end it. Unfinished wars are exhausting, while aggressive wars call into question the reputation and moral standing of those who start them. Perhaps more can indeed be achieved by banks than by tanks. Great powers sometimes fall into the “imperial trap,” not knowing when to stop. They often overestimate their own power. They act more like offensive rather than defensive realists – they deal with issues that can have negative consequences for their power. Therefore, says Cliff Kupchan, director of the Institute for Eurasian Studies, China will rise to the level of power that the United States has, partly because the power of the United States will weaken, as will the position of Russia. China's policy of “peaceful rise,” if it remains peaceful, will promote and upgrade it to the other pole of the new world order. If this happens, if Chinese technology continues to advance in the way it has in recent decades, if the liberal-democratic framework and its global dominance continue to be questioned – China will be able to ask the question: who, in fact, won in 1989: the West or the East? Capitalism or communism? Perhaps it is indeed too early to make a final judgment on this.

But there are also reasons to be cautious in assessing China's growth. Its growth is slowing, and China itself shows no great desire to

extend its power to the entire world. Regardless of the connections through the Belt and Road, China rejects universalist ideas and intentions, and is also wary of becoming hated, which is always the fate of the world's largest power. It is better to be Pepsi Cola than Coca Cola, because Coca Cola is a symbol of Western capitalist domination, so all the hatred of others is concentrated against it - while no one touches Pepsi Cola. Sometimes more can be achieved in the shadows than in the position of global leader.

That is why some authors believe that the new world will be more multipolar or even non-polar than unipolar or bipolar. Stephen Walt is of the opinion that the global hegemony of the West has never been as strong as it is thought. Also, potential rivals of the West have no interest in connecting with China and placing themselves under its influence. In the modern world, there are strong networks in which powerful non-state actors participate. Contemporary security today is more connected with participation in these international networks than in classical international organizations or through the control of the international order. The role of international organizations is weakening, so it seems as if there is no order. However, states can no longer fight for their goals, but must rely on these "safety nets". Even the US is no longer able to maintain its previous alliances, it acts unilaterally and without coordination, choosing illogical partners - which sometimes play a leading role in this sponsor-client relationship (for example Israel, and in Europe, Hungary). Alliances are changing, increasingly based not only on "common values" but also on pragmatic economic and other interests (as in the new EU - India relations). Alliances "fail" at key moments - for example, when Iran was attacked... (Except for North Korea, which militarily helped Russia in the war with Ukraine); or in the matter of helping Venezuela or tomorrow maybe Cuba. America creates new partnerships (Board of Peace, instead of NATO), undermining the existing ones because

they still limit its unilateral power. Strategic thinking has also weakened: in the case of Russia in relation to Ukraine, where the policy of "by banks, not by tanks" is abandoned - and in the case of the USA, in which the power of rational structures that create strategies (of the State Department, the intelligence sector) has been reduced - and they have been greatly weakened internally by the autocratic politics that characterizes the second term of Donald Trump.

In this context, proponents of the thesis that the new world will be non-polar point to the experiment developed by the European Union. The highest degree of structuring, the highest rules, and even the highest ideological cohesion, economic cooperation and legal regulations are currently being developed within it. It is neither a state nor a classic empire, although it also has features that states previously had and those that historically belonged to empires. It has managed to take over numerous functions of statehood, such as money, European borders with third countries, common policies to reduce the differences between rich and poor member states, and even a common higher education system and labor market. The structure of the European Union is far stronger than the structure of the global order, and at the same time, aggressive policies of the struggle for power through wars and attacks on other countries have been avoided.

At one time - in the mid-1990s - Anthony Giddens saw precisely in the European Union model the core for the transformation of the entire international order, believing that it must include global elections and global taxes. He looked at NATO as the future army of the democratized United Nations, believing that the UN General Assembly should be divided into two houses - the lower one, which will represent the citizens of the world (as the European Parliament represents the citizens of the EU) and the senate, in which the states will be represented. Later developments, with de-

globalization and re-sovereignization , distanced us from that ideal and that vision. But the crisis in which we are now raises the question of an alternative.

The EU continues to be the most solid actor, despite its limited reach to the countries of the European continent. It has nevertheless managed to: a) stop further decline after Brexit ; b) maintain the institutions it developed on the basis of a liberal concept (ERASMUS, Schengen, Euro); c) maintain a high degree of unity on the issue of Ukraine, as well as on the issue of "strategic autonomy" in relation to the USA; while at the same time successfully avoiding torpedoing individual countries that disagree with the majority - through the opt-out policy , and d) preserve peace on a continent over which wars are being waged.

In a world of weakening international organizations and agreements, the EU acts as a very solid system – both ideologically and geopolitically. It has gained clear “Others” (enemies) – which nevertheless somewhat homogenizes the Self , the identity of Europe as the guardian of liberal values and peace, democracy and procedural rules. The resilience of the EU and its solidarity with its member states are all the more impressive when one considers the new situation – with two major wars in its immediate neighbourhood, and the democratic character of the government in the member states, which however always leaves some room for change and thus for the disruption of the unity of the Union. The EU is currently successfully fighting against the nationalism of its members, and against pro-Russian and pro-American (pro- Trumpist) forces that have not managed – for now – to take control of any member state, regardless of partial successes in some. There is greater fragmentation within the US than within the EU. In Russia, fragmentation is prevented by force and firm control over the entire society.

The aggressive policies of the US and Russia weaken their power – because they have so far been unsuccessful or only partially successful in their implementation. Without the use of nuclear weapons, they do not have the advantage that exists on paper, which stems from the status of nuclear powers. Will this encourage them to use this – ultimate – “argument”, so as not to look like a “paper tiger”? At the same time, the soft power as well as the moral power of these two powers has significantly weakened. They have lost some former allies or potential allies. It is difficult to be a friend of a country that launches offensive wars. Even in countries where public opinion has a great understanding for the US (e.g. in Albania) or for Russia (e.g. in Serbia) – these countries remain oriented towards EU membership: more so now than before the wars in Ukraine and Iran began. The countries of the Western Balkans today understand the West much more as the European Union than the US – although they are institutionally more connected to the US (through NATO membership, without EU membership), while they are still economically strongly connected to the EU. The geopolitical orientation of their foreign policies places them firmly in Europe, and the possible disintegration of NATO (through the American withdrawal) would further distance them from the USA. The countries of the Western Balkans fear Trump's unpredictability - and they rely more on European countries (eg France and Germany) and China (eg Serbia) than on the USA for armaments. The EU sees these new trends, so it starts talking about enlargement again - towards which, however, it is still more hesitant than it should be. Countries such as Albania and Serbia - very different in terms of their foreign policy orientations and goals - make additional concessions by proposing to enter the EU even if it means that they will not have all the rights of the members, for example by renouncing the right of veto as well as the right to vote within the Union, at least in the first moment after entering the Union. This shows how much they still care

about becoming part of Europe.

When it comes to creating a multipolar world, this option is the most likely, but there are problems here too. Countries that could be actors in such a world as some mini-superpowers are trying to step back from the stage, and some (like Iran) are being attacked. They do not feel safe. They have very different goals and positions. Within each region that they could possibly control (and must, if the world becomes multipolar with more regional hegemonies) there is resistance to their new role, and there are proxy countries backed by one of the major superpowers. Until the major wars fought by the major superpowers end, there will be no stability needed to encourage the mini-superpowers to take on their new roles. Countries that want to step back, that pursue a policy of subterfuge – cannot become major actors in international politics.

What is the position of small and medium-sized countries in all this? By small countries we mean those with less than 40 million inhabitants and without a sponsor among any of the great powers. The European Union is an association of such countries – which, for historical reasons and the current limited power they have – have decided to unite in a relatively solid structure in order to achieve their main national interests, among which security is in the first place. The EU is an anti-war project, created on the understanding that the European continent was the scene of the largest wars in the 20th century, and that totalitarian, anti-democratic and authoritarian ideologies and policies developed there, which were defeated – either in World War II or later, with the end of the Cold War (1989). Even those countries that were and are large in European terms and medium-sized in global circumstances – have experienced dramatic defeats, losses of territories and colonies, stigmatization and external restrictions on sovereignty. They therefore correctly concluded that absolute sovereignty of such countries is neither possible nor desirable.

They formed their benevolent democratic "empire" in order to become – through the European Union – globally significant countries. If they want to remain so, they must preserve and develop, strengthen and popularize, the European Union.

After 1989, the European Union became the political and economic hegemon of the European continent. It enabled the "rehabilitation" of previously defeated countries, as well as the consolidation of those that gained independence after 1990. It decided to do this by combining a liberally driven domestic policy and a realistically driven idea of realizing one's own interests. An integral part of this is the policy of intervening in the candidate countries so that they become constructive actors in the Union as a whole. The process of Europeanization and expansion of the Union to the countries of the immediate eastern neighborhood was in accordance with the liberal policy of "democratic peace" and the concept of "liberal interventionism". Today, this liberal interventionism faces the "illiberal", "anti-democratic" interventionism of the great powers neighboring Europe (or even semi-connected with it): the USA and Russia. Although both of these countries played a crucial role (along with the United Kingdom) in liberating Europe from fascism and Nazism, today they have rejected the policy of friendship with the European Union and represent a threat to it. They have thus called into question both the concepts of Euro-Atlanticism and Eurasianism. While Europe has always had a skeptical attitude towards Russia, it has had illusions towards the US from which it is now freeing itself, primarily through Macron's policy of "strategic autonomy". This policy is today pursued under the unspoken but omnipresent slogan "Europe for Europeans".

In this context, the objectives of the European Union should remain as follows: 1) preserving peace on the European continent; 2) maintaining existing and developing new

European Union institutions, which includes more efficient decision-making, probably through the rejection of the principle of unanimity, which gives too much power to potential veto actors, some of whom could perhaps become proxy actors for one of the external great powers; 3) strengthening self-defense security networks within the EU - which also means abandoning the idea of interventionism outside the Union, even when it is "humanitarian" or "liberal"; 4) strengthening the economic power of the Union through pragmatic connections with economies that are strengthening - e.g. India and China, and the Gulf countries; 5) preserving and strengthening the democratic character of all European Union countries, through more active resistance to attempts at de-democratization, so that Europe becomes - if necessary - a "fortress of democratic values"; and 6) increasing and strategically developing "soft power", i.e. the attractiveness of the European model of governance, which would make it a potential role model for others. Europe can and must cooperate with all those who are oriented towards peace, who fear world wars, and especially with those who develop similar models of governance, based on respect for and expansion of human rights, human security, and the timeless values of the Enlightenment, which are today under threat.

Multipolarity suits the European Union better than unipolarity and bipolarity, because within that framework it can remain - or perhaps: become - a significant global actor, which must be one of its goals. Europe's attractiveness to others - whether on the European continent or beyond - lies precisely in the fact that the EU is today the only major global actor that is unquestionably democratic. It can build on this to become even more attractive to everyone outside it.

When it comes to the Western Balkans, it is important that both the EU and the countries in the region understand and accept that they are part of Europe. The term Western Balkans

was coined in 1997, but from the very beginning the Western Balkans was not conceived as a permanent but rather a temporary region. It was conceived as a waiting room for membership in the European Union, not as a waiting room for Godot who would never come. These countries are economically, security-wise and politically dependent on the European Union, which should stop hesitating about their admission to membership. They have waited too long, and in that waiting they have become less democratic, more authoritarian, less developed, more corrupt, less European and more confused, while some have even flirted with other actors, such as Russia, China and the USA. These countries must become members of the European Union as soon as possible, no matter how far removed they are from the standards required for membership today compared to 20 years ago. An opportunity was missed then, but it must not be missed today. The risks of their remaining outside the Union are far greater than the risks of their admission to the Union. The Western Balkans were like a tent, a temporary shelter after the devastating earthquake they experienced with the collapse of the previous global order (1989). The tent is welcome as a temporary but not a permanent solution. If they remain outside the Union, their resistance to Europe will increase, their frustration with non-acceptance and misunderstanding will grow - which will benefit Europe's opponents, not Europe. Only within the Union can they develop as European countries, democratic, peace-oriented and cooperative, ready to contribute to the overall security of the European continent.

Croatia is today a good example of integration into the European Union. However, this integration must also be reflected in its policy towards the enlargement of the Union to the countries of the Western Balkans. A strong and integral European Union is in its interest, even when it seems that for this purpose it must give up some of its specific interests towards a

particular country in its immediate neighbourhood. An ox should not be killed for a kilo of meat – and therefore, the interests of the European Union should not be endangered for the sake of an ethnically driven foreign policy through threats of a veto or identity- or historically inspired conditions for membership for these countries. It is logical that every country, including Croatia, takes into account its specific interests. However, there is no greater interest for a small country in Europe than strengthening the European Union. And when it comes to these specific interests, they will be better protected and implemented if the hard borders between the Union and other countries are removed – borders that Croatia maintains today, and which divide even the Croatian citizens, a significant part of whom live outside the European Union. Even from the position of selfish nationalism, which is not weak in Croatia, the entry of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia would be in the interest of Croatia itself.

The world is in turmoil today – and parts of it are at war. It is difficult to say with certainty what it will be like after these wars, after the uncertainty and insecurity that we all feel today. But that does not mean that we do not need to have a vision that distinguishes the desirable from the undesirable, the acceptable from the dangerous, and the useful from the harmful. Evading these questions – the questions of a vision of the future world – sometimes seems like the best option. In foreign policy theory, this option is called quietism. But: what is the point of states that want to be invisible and that do not want to participate in shaping the world? Those who do not want to participate cannot later complain that a world they did not want was created.

Transformacija međunarodnog poretka: što nakon unipolarnosti?

Prof. dr. sc. Dejan Jović, profesor međunarodnih odnosa na Fakultetu političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, predsjednik Upravnog odbora Foruma za vanjsku politiku

Dopustite da najprije objasnim glavne pojmove koje ću koristiti u ovom predavanju. To su pojmovi „transformacija“, „međunarodni poredak“, i „unipolarnost“, a u širem smislu – s obzirom na alternative unipolarnosti i pojmovi bipolarnosti, višepolarnosti ili nepolarnosti. Premda se olako koriste, pa u toj upotrebi u javnom diskursu dobivaju razna značenja – kao što i gube jasnoću – o svakome od tih pojmova napisane su brojne knjige. Za nas koji se profesionalno bavimo međunarodnim odnosima, međunarodnim poretkom i vanjskim politikama, radi se o temeljnim pojmovima.

Pojam „transformacija“ ovdje se koristi tako da opiše proces neprekidnih promjena koje stvaraju od istog materijala nove oblike. To je preoblikovanje nečega, uz svijest da možda oni koji preoblikuju nemaju uopće viziju konačnog poželjnog oblika ili da je vizija koju imaju sekundarna u odnosu na potrebu da reagiraju na vizije i akcije drugih, te da zaštite svoje nacionalne interese. Ne očekuju da sama materija nestane, niti da je napustimo kao potrošenu, nemodernu ili nepotrebnu – npr. tako da međunarodni poredak nestane i da ga zamijeni trajno stanje anarhije. Radi se o neprekidnoj dinamičnoj interakciji, u kojoj sudjeluju – u ovom slučaju – države, ali i drugi akteri: međunarodne sigurnosne mreže, međunarodne organizacije, multinacionalne korporacije, međunarodni mediji, globalni procesi trgovine i dr. Među njima nema – i nikada neće ni biti – suglasnosti o tome što žele promijeniti i kako. Ideje i interesi, ciljevi i načini na koji pojedini akteri žele transformirati postojeće stanje u neko novo se neprekidno sudaraju, često pritom čineći pogreške u odnosu na vlastite ciljeve ili čak i djelujući nasilno, onda kad zaključe da na druge načine ne mogu postići svoje ciljeve.

Ako se radi o organiziranijoj i planski osmišljenoj

transformaciji, možemo govoriti o tranziciji. Tranzicija barem ima jasan početak, ako ne i jasan kraj. Ona započinje onda kad se stari poredak više ne može održati, a novi još ne može uspostaviti. Za razliku od transformacije koja je neprekidna i prilično nepredvidiva, tranzicija je najčešće ograničena po trajanju. Ona traje od početka kraja starog poretka do kraja početka novog. Da bi bila uspješna, ona mora uključivati transfer moći iz ruku starih elita u ruke novih. Da bi taj transfer bio organiziran i miran, nenasilan, potrebno je da se stvori tranzicijski pakt. Takav pakt moraju stvoriti umjerene snage starog poretka i umjerene snage novoga poretka. Njihov je glavni zadatak da marginaliziraju ekstremiste na tzv. „svojoj“ strani. Umjereni političari starog poretka moraju biti u stanju spriječiti ekstremne (radikalne) političare starog poretka da upotrijebe nasilje kako bi spriječili tranziciju moći. Istodobno, umjereni političari novih vladajućih snaga moraju biti u stanju spriječiti ekstremiste (revolucionare) u novoj eliti, kako bi se spriječilo osvetničko krvoproliće nakon promjena. Svako krvoproliće stvara nove, duboke i trajne podjele, te time onemogućuje stabilizaciju novog poretka.

Promjene koje vidimo u suvremenim međunarodnim odnosima više liče na transformaciju nego na tranziciju. Obrisi novog svijeta još se ne naziru, ali prevladava uvjerenje da se stari više ne može održati. Uz to, izgleda da će stanje dugo trajati, da neće skoro završiti. Tako, primjerice, pišući u časopisu *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* prošle godine o transformaciji međunarodnog poretka, Mehdi Sanaei zaključuje da je pred nama dugo međurazdoblje, u kojem će stari poredak biti oslabljen ali će i dalje postojati, a novi neće biti formiran.

Zadnji puta kad je došlo do promjene karaktera međunarodnog poretka – a to je bilo s krajem

Hladnog rata – radilo se ipak više o tranziciji nego o transformaciji (u smislu u kojem sam je ovdje opisao). Stari, bipolarni, poredak se brzo srušio, prije svega zbog kolapsa Sovjetskog Saveza i potom raspuštanja njegovog glavnog instrumenta održanja moći u Europi: Varšavskog pakta. Brzina kojom se to dogodilo zatekla je mnoge, pa i zapadne zemlje. U jednom je momentu izgledalo čak da se Zapad plaši posljedica kolabiranja SSSR-a i Istočne Europe. Zapad nije bio spreman na kraj Hladnog rata – pa, recimo, nije postupio kako bi se očekivalo u novim okolnostima, raspuštanjem NATO-a i povlačenjem iz Europe. To je, kao što vidimo danas, bio jedan od razloga obnove ideje bipolarnosti u Europi, kroz protivljenje NATO-u, prije svega od strane Rusije – doduše ne odmah, ne za vrijeme Jeljcina, pa čak ne ni sa samim početkom Putinove vladavine u Rusiji, nego tek nakon što su se (nakon NATO-ove intervencije oko Kosova, nakon 11. septembra 2001, te nakon rata u Iraku) pokazale prve ozbiljne krize liberalnog poretka, koji je proklamiran tezom da liberalizam i demokracija „nemaju alternativu“ jer ni u svijetu ideja nije moguće čak ni zamisliti neki bolji, drukčiji, svijet. To je, pokazalo se, bila iluzija. Povijest nema kraj, pa i nikada ne staje. Ključni moment te transformacije – od poretka kojeg je Charles Krauthammer 1990. nazvao „unipolarni momentom“, prema nekom novom, post-unipolarnom – bio je Putinov govor na Minhenskoj konferenciji 2007.

Nažalost, neočekivana i brza tranzicija koja se dogodila 1989. godine stvorila je i moment kaosa i anarhije, u kojem je naročito stradala Jugoistočna Europa, odnosno Balkan. U njemu je ne samo kolabirala Jugoslavija, kao i njene glavne višenacionalne republike (Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina i Srbija) nego je novi globalni hegemon oklijevao u obavljanju uloge koja mu je pripala – a to je uloga jamca sigurnosti i stabilnosti. To oklijevanje mnogi u platili svojim životima u razdoblju od 1991. do 1995., a i kasnije – do 1999. Neočekivana i nepripremljena tranzicija, dakle, mogu ostaviti

duboke i tragične posljedice. To je lekcija koju smo trebali naučiti iz prošle situacije – kako nam se ne bi ponovila. Te posljedice nisu za sve zemlje iste. Na periferijama, na mjestima doticaja prethodnih interesnih sfera i sfera moći, postoje veći rizici da se stvori pukotina kroz koju zemlje mogu potonuti u nasilje i nestabilnost. Za te zemlje je posebno važno da se tranzicija obavi na uredan način, kako bi se uspostavio novi poredak koji bi mogao osigurati mir kad države to ne mogu ili ne žele.

Spomenuli smo i pojam „međunarodnog poretka“. Taj poredak nikad nije ni onako čvrst ni onako stabilan kao što je domaći politički poredak, naprosto zato što ne postoji svjetska država. Realisti u međunarodnim odnosima čak dovode u pitanje i njegov smisao, govoreći radije o međunarodnoj areni, a ne o poretku. I doista, i u bipolarnom poretku Hladnog rata bilo je i trećih sila, kao i zona u kojima bipolarizam nije bio prisutan, tako da bipolarizam nije bio onako solidan i čvrst kako se u teoriji opisuje. Postojanje Trećeg svijeta, funkcioniranje grupe nesvrstanih i neutralnih zemalja (čak i u Europi), postojanje neuklopljenih država (rogue states), čak i onih koje su provodile svoje ideološke i vjerske projekte (npr. kroz islamsku revoluciju u Iranu 1979. godine) – sve su to bile manifestacije otklona od bipolarizma. A i dok je trajao, unutar saveza kojima je gospodario hegemon dolazilo je do konflikta, kao što je bila sovjetska invazija Čehoslovačke 1968. godine.

Ni u doba „unipolarnog momenta“ nije postojao savršeni unipolarizam ni hegemonizam samo jedne sile – Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Koristeći riječ „moment“ za opisivanje novog stanja, realisti su zapravo priznali da unipolarizam neće vječno trajati. Unipolarna sila uvijek potiče druge da se odupru i udruže kako bi uravnoteživali stanje time što će formirati anti-silu. Porast antiamerikanizma u svijetu u 2000-im godinama, bilo od strane Rusije ili Kine, ili od strane islamskih pokreta i sličnih anti-zapadnih pokušaja – pokazuju da se protivljenje

svjetskom hegemonu ne može zaustaviti. Premda su Sjedinjene Države u tom periodu bile najmoćnije u svojoj i u svjetskoj povijesti, najснаžniji unipolarizam postojao je u tom razdoblju u Europi, gdje je Europska unija postala moćni unipolarni hegemon, istiskujući sve alternative.

To nas vodi prema definiranju pojma „polarnost“. Što su polovi u međunarodnim odnosima? Polovi su oblici organizacije međunarodnih odnosa koje oblikuju velike sile koje uspostavljaju svoj poredak, promovirajući ne samo svoje vrijednosti kao jedine koje treba štiti, nego i stvarajući institucije, pravila i običaje, konvencije i druge forme međunarodnog prava, koje postaju obavezne za sve koji su uključeni u njihov „pol“. Polovi su oblici organiziranja i tvrde i meke i pametne (smart) moći. Oni su institucije kontroliranja teritorija, te organizacije povezivanja sličnih zemalja kako bi postale moćnije u međunarodnoj areni. Velike sile jedine mogu organizirati polove. Međutim, ne pokušavaju sve velike sile organizirati polove, pa ni organizacije kao što su paktovi i savezi oko sebe. Neke zemlje smatraju da su im savezi i paktovi nepotrebni ili čak i štetni za njihove nacionalne interese. One preferiraju djelovati unilateralno, same – ili, kad trebaju saveznike, kroz ad hoc, privremene i nestrukturirane koalicije (npr. „koalicije voljnih“) za djelovanje u nekom konkretnom slučaju, odnosno u nekoj konkretnoj vojnoj ili političkoj akciji. Velike sile su velike po tome što same mogu odlučiti kad su im savezi korisni a kad štetni. One ponekad smatraju da su im velike strategije također ponekad ograničavajuće. Kao što je svojedobno rekao Henry Kissinger – Amerika nije velika po tome što ima veliku strategiju, nego po tome što ima veliku moć. Ona možda sama odlučiti kad će i što će ignorirati i dopustiti, a što neće. Ona ima mogućnost da intervenira kad želi i da ne intervenira kad procjeni da joj to više odgovara.

Danas živimo u doba intenzivne transformacije međunarodnog poretka koji liči više na

ne-poredak, na kaos bez pravila, na marginaliziranje postojećih saveza i običaja, nego na institucionaliziranje neke strategije ili čak i vizije budućeg poretka. Upravo to stvara neizvjesnost i nesigurnost, u kojoj se male zemlje koje nemaju ni mogućnosti niti ambicija da same oblikuju međunarodni poredak često ne snalaze, i u kojem se osjećaju nezaštićenima i ugroženima. One se pokušavaju izmaknuti iz kaosa, kako ne bi trpjele negativne posljedice transformacije, ali se pritom i pitaju – kako će izgledati budući poredak, tko će ga presudno oblikovati i kako se prilagoditi budućem poretku? One se pitaju prije svega: hoće li novi poredak biti novi unipolarizam, ili bipolarizam ili multipolarizam ili nepolarni poredak?

O tim pitanjima nema suglasnosti ni u političkoj ni u akademskoj sferi. Kao što piše u već spomenutom članku Sanaei, jedna od mogućnosti je povratak na unipolarizam, u kojem bi američka moć i dalje bila presudna i ogromna. William Kindred Winecoff tako – u članku objavljenom 2020. godine u *European Journal of International Relations* – tvrdi da je ideja o „izgubljenoj hegemoniji“ SAD-a zapravo mit. Tu tezu obrazlaže time što je vojna, ali i medijska, financijska i politička moć SAD i Zapada općenito i dalje neupitno velika i dovoljna da oblikuje ponašanje svih drugih aktera. Drugi autori, kao što su Stephen Brooks i William Wohlforth (u članku u *Foreign Affairs* iz 2016.) osporavaju tezu da će Kina prestići SAD u bilo kojem od tih aspekata. Kina, osim toga, ne pokazuje želju da formira svoje saveze niti da nametne svoje vrijednosti drugima u svijetu. Rusija je – naročito svojim ratom protiv Ukrajine – oslabjela svoju poziciju do mjere u kojoj je danas mnogo teže biti njen prijatelj nego što je bilo prije 2022. ili čak i prije 2014. Ona je pritom ostala „spoiler power“, sposobna da uznemiri ili omete SAD i Zapad, ali ne i da uspostavi svoj alternativni poredak.

S tom se procjenom, međutim, ne slažu neki od vodećih teoretičara međunarodnog poretka, kao što su (danas pokojni) Kenneth

Waltz i Zbigniew Brzezinski, ili John Ikenberry. Oni ipak vide rast alternativnih sila, ukazujući na globalni rast Kine, kao i Indije, Brazila, Južne Afrike i Indonezije, koje postaju moćne regionalne sile. Tu su i Turska, Saudijska Arabija i drugi – koji se ponašaju prilično samostalno. Turska je posebno zanimljiv slučaj – zemlja koja je u NATO-u a često se ponaša različito od SAD-a u pitanjima koja su njoj važna, kao što je npr. Sirija, Kurdistan ili Iran. Sjetimo se pritom Ahmeta Davutoglua i njegove knjige „Strategijska dubina“ u kojoj on promovira Tursku kao regionalnu silu koja treba prestati biti privjesak SAD-a i mora postati najutjecajnija država tzv. Afro-Euroazije. U takvim zemljama okretanje sebi ima funkciju podizanja statusa. To je moguće samo tako da se formiraju tzv. megaregije, regije koje aspirirajuća velika sila formira sa željom da ih kontrolira. A tu je, naravno, i Europska unija koja danas shvaća da će se morati dodatno emancipirati od SAD-a: bilo zato što to sama želi ili zato što se SAD udaljava od nje. O tome ćemo više reći u nastavku ovog predavanja.

Neki od tih autora tvrde da se stvara novi bipolarni svijet – gdje se Kina izdiže u odnosu na druge i svi se povezuju s njom. Ostali slabe, međusobno su posvađani ili čak i ratuju. Oni koji su uvjereni u bipolarnu budućnost svijeta govore o podjeli na West and the Rest, te ukazuju da će pravi pobjednik ratova u Ukrajini i Iranu biti – Kina, ili – u širem smislu – Azija i Afrika. Oni najavljuju da će 21. stoljeće postati stoljeće Istoka, pri čemu Rusija ne spada u Istok nego se nalazi između Zapada i Istoka.

Oni koji ulaze u ratove, slabe svoju poziciju – jer je rat lakše započeti nego završiti. Nezavršeni ratovi iscrpljuju, a agresivni ratovi dovode u pitanje reputaciju i moralnu poziciju onih koji ih započinju. Možda se ipak više može postići by banks than by tanks. Velike sile ponekad upadaju u „imperijalnu klopku“, ne znajući kad treba stati i precjenjujući svoju moć. One se ponašaju više kao ofenzivni nego defenzivni realisti – bave se pitanjima koja

mogu imati i negativne posljedice za njihovu moć. Stoga će, kaže recimo direktor Instituta za euroazijske studije Cliff Kupchan, Kina narasti do razine moći koju ima SAD, dijelom i zbog toga što će moć SAD-a slabiti, kao što će slabiti i pozicija Rusije. Kineska politika „miroljubivog uspona“, ako ostane na miroljubivom pristupu, učinit će je drugim polom novog svjetskog poretka. Ako se to dogodi, ako kineska tehnologija nastavi napredovati na način kako je to bilo u zadnjim desetljećima, ako se nastavi dovoditi u pitanje liberalno-demokratski okvir i njegova globalna dominacija – Kina će moći postaviti pitanje: tko je, zapravo, pobijedio 1989: Zapad ili Istok? Kapitalizam ili komunizam? Možda je doista prerano da se donese konačan sud o tome.

No, ima i opravdanja i za oprez u procjeni takvog rasta Kine. Njen rast usporava, a ona sama ne pokazuje veliku želju da svoju moć protegne na cijeli svijet. Bez obzira na povezivanje kroz Pojas i put, Kina odbacuje univerzalističke ideje i namjere, a također je i oprezna da ne postane omražena, što je uvijek sudbina najveće svjetske sile. Bolje je biti Pepsi Cola nego Coca Cola, jer je Coca Cola simbol zapadne kapitalističke dominacije, pa se sva mržnja ostalih koncentrirala protiv nje – dok Pepsi Cola nitko ne dira. U zavjetnici se ponekad može postići više nego na poziciji globalnog lidera.

Zato neki autori vjeruju da će novi svijet biti više multipolarni ili čak i nepolarni nego unipolarni ili bipolarni. Stephen Walt je, tako, mišljenja da globalna hegemonija Zapada nikad nije bila tako jaka kako se misli. Također, potencijalni rivali Zapada nemaju interesa da se povežu s Kinom i da se stave pod njen utjecaj. U suvremenom svijetu postoje snažne mreže (networks) u kojima participiraju moćni nedržavni akteri. Suvremena sigurnost danas je više povezana sa sudjelovanjem u tim međunarodnim mrežama, nego u klasičnim međunarodnim organizacijama ili kroz kontrolu međunarodnog poretka. Slabi uloga međunarodnih organizacija, pa se čini kao da

nema poretka. Međutim, države se više ne mogu izboriti za svoje ciljeve, nego se moraju oslanjati na te „sigurnosne mreže“. Čak ni SAD više nisu u stanju održati svoja prethodna savezništva, djeluju unilateralno i bez koordiniranja, birajući nelogične partnere – koji ponekad imaju ulogu lidera u tom sponzorsko-klijentskom odnosu (npr. Izrael, a u Europi Mađarska). Mijenjaju se savezništva, sve više zasnovana ne samo na „zajedničkim vrijednostima“ nego i na pragmatičnim ekonomskim i drugim interesima (npr. EU – Indija). Savezništva u ključnim momentima „zataje“ – npr. kad je Iran napadnut... (Osim Sjeverne Koreje koja je pomogla vojno Rusiji u ratu s Ukrajinom); ili u pitanju pomoći Venezueli ili sutra možda Kubi. Amerika stvara nova partnerstva (Board of Peace, umjesto NATO), podriva postojeća jer ona ipak ograničavaju njenu unilateralnu snagu. Oslabljeno je i strateško mišljenje: u slučaju Rusije u odnosu na Ukrajinu napuštena je politika „by banks, not by tanks“ a u slučaju SAD je umanjena moć racionalnih struktura koje stvaraju strategije (State Departmenta, obavještajnog sektora) – te su one vrlo oslabljene iznutra autokratskom politikom koja karakterizira drugi mandat Donalda Trumpa.

U tom kontekstu, zagovornici teze da će novi svijet biti nepolaran ukazuju na eksperiment koji je razvila Europska unija. Najviše strukture, najviše pravila, pa i najviše ideološke kohezije, ekonomske suradnje i pravnih regula danas se razvija upravo unutar nje. Ona nije ni država ni klasičan imperij, premda ima i osobine koje su ranije imale države i one koje su povijesno pripadale imperijima. Uspjela je preuzeti brojne funkcije državnosti, kao što su npr. novac, zajedničke granice prema trećim zemljama, zajedničke politike smanjenja razlika između bogatih i siromašnih zemalja-članica, te čak i zajednički visoko-obrazovni sustav i tržište rada. Struktura Europske unije je daleko čvršća od strukture globalnog poretka, a istodobno su izbjegnute agresivne politike borbe za moć kroz ratove i napade na

druge zemlje.

Svojedobno je – sredinom 1990-ih – Anthony Giddens upravo u modelu Europske unije vidio jezgro za transformaciju cijelog međunarodnog poretka, smatrajući da on mora uključivati i globalne izbore i globalne poreze. On je na NATO gledao kao na buduću vojsku demokratiziranih Ujedinjenih nacija, smatrajući da bi Generalnu skupštinu UN-a trebalo podijeliti na dva doma – donji koji će predstavljati građane svijeta (kao što Europski parlament predstavlja građane EU-a) i senat u kojem će biti zastupljene države. Kasniji razvoj događaja, s de-globalizacijom i re-suverenizacijom, udaljio nas je od tog ideala i te vizije. Ali, kriza u kojoj se sada nalazimo otvara opet pitanje alternative.

EU se pokazuje i dalje najsolidnijim akterom bez obzira na to što je njen domet ograničen na zemlje europskog kontinenta. Ona je ipak uspjela: a) zaustaviti daljnje smanjivanje nakon Brexita; b) održati institucije koje je razvila na temelju liberalnog koncepta (ERASMUS, Schengen, Euro); c) održati visok stupanj jedinstva po pitanju Ukrajine, kao i po pitanju „strateške autonomije“ u odnosu na SAD; dok istodobno uspješno izbjegava torpediranje pojedinih zemalja koje se ne slažu s većinom – kroz politiku opting-out, i d) očuvati mir na kontinentu oko kojeg se vode ratovi.

U svijetu slabljenja međunarodnih organizacija i dogovora, EU djeluje kao vrlo solidan sistem – i to i u ideološkom i u geopolitičkom smislu. Dobio je jasne „Druge“ (neprijatelje) – što ipak donekle homogenizira Sebstvo (Self) Europe kao čuvarice liberalnih vrijednosti i mira, demokracije i proceduralnih pravila. Otpornost EU (resilience) i njena solidarnost sa zemljama-članicama je to impresivnija kad se uzme u obzir nova situacija – s dva velika rata u njenom neposrednom susjedstvu, te demokratski karakter vlasti u zemljama-članicama, što uvijek ostavlja mogućnost promjena a time i narušavanja jedinstva Unije. EU se zasad uspješno bori protiv nacionalizma

svojih članica, te protiv pro-ruskih i pro-američkih (pro-trumpističkih) snaga koje nisu uspjele – zasada – ovladati nijednom zemljom-članicom, bez obzira na djelomične uspjehe u nekima. Veća je fragmentacija unutar SAD nego unutar EU. U Rusiji se fragmentacija sprječava silom i čvrstom kontrolom nad cijelim društvom.

Agresivne politike SAD i Rusije slabe njihovu moć – jer su zasad neuspješne ili samo djelomično uspješne u njihovoj implementaciji. Bez korištenja nuklearnog oružja one nemaju onu prednost koja postoji na papiru, a koja proizlazi iz statusa nuklearnih sila. Hoće li ih to potaći da koriste i taj – ultimativni – „argument“, kako ne bi izgledale kao „tigar od papira“? Istodobno, meka moć kao i moralna moć te dvije sile je značajno oslabila. One su izgubile neke dotadašnje saveznike ili potencijalne saveznike. Teško je biti prijatelj zemlji koja pokreće ofenzivne ratove. Čak i u zemljama gdje javno mnijenje ima veliko razumijevanje za SAD (npr. u Albaniji) ili za Rusiju (npr. u Srbiji) – te zemlje ostaju i dalje orijentirane prema članstvu u EU: više sada nego prije početka ratova u Ukrajini i Iranu. Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana danas pod Zapadom podrazumijevaju daleko više Europsku uniju nego SAD – premda su institucionalno više povezane sa SAD (kroz članstvo u NATO-u, bez članstva u EU), dok su ekonomski i dalje izrazito povezane s EU. Geopolitička orijentacija njihovih vanjskih politika smješta ih čvrsto u Europu, a eventualni raspad NATO-a (kroz američko povlačenje) bi ih još više udaljio od SAD-a. Zemlje Zapadnog Balkana strahuju od Trumpove nepredvidivosti – a u naoružavanju se oslanjaju više na europske zemlje (npr. Francusku i Njemačku) i na Kinu (npr. Srbija) nego na SAD. EU vidi te nove trendove, pa počinje opet govoriti o proširenju – prema kojem, međutim, i dalje oklijeva više nego što bi trebala. Zemlje kao što su Albanija i Srbija – vrlo različite po svojim vanjskopolitičkim orijentacijama i ciljevima – čine dodatne ustupke predlažući da uđu u EU čak i ako to

znači da neće imati sva prava članica, npr. odričući se prava veta kao i prava na glasanje unutar Unije, barem u prvom momentu nakon ulaska u Uniju. To pokazuje koliko im je ipak stalo da postanu dio Europe.

Kad se radi o stvaranju multipolarnog svijeta, ta je opcija najizglednija, ali i tu postoje problemi. Zemlje koje bi mogle biti akteri u takvom svijetu kao neke mini-supersile pokušavaju se skloniti s pozornice, a neke su (poput Irana) napadnute. Ne osjećaju se sigurnima. Imaju vrlo različite međusobne ciljeve i pozicije. Unutar svake regije koju bi možda i mogle kontrolirati (i morale, ako svijet postane multipolarnan s većim brojem regionalnih hegemoni) postoji otpor njihovoj novoj ulozi, a postoje i proxy zemlje iza kojih stoji neka od velikih supersila. Sve dok se ne završe veliki ratovi u kojima ratuju velike supersile neće biti potrebne stabilnosti da bi se mini supersile ohrabrile da preuzmu svoje nove uloge. Zemlje koje se žele skloniti, koje vode politiku spuštanja pod stol – ne mogu postati veliki akteri u međunarodnoj politici.

Kakva je u svemu tome pozicija malih i srednje velikih zemalja? Pod malim zemljama smatramo one koje imaju ispod 40 milijuna stanovnika i nemaju iza sebe sponzora među nekom od velikih sila. Europska unija je udruženje takvih zemalja – koje su što iz povijesnih razloga a što ih sadašnje ograničene moći koju imaju – odlučile da se povežu u relativno čvrstu strukturu kako bi ostvarile svoje glavne državne interese, među kojima je sigurnost na prvom mjestu. EU je antiratni projekt, nastao na razumijevanju da je upravo europski kontinent u 20. stoljeću bio poprište najvećih ratova, te da su se u njemu razvile totalitarne, anti-demokratske i autoritarne ideologije i politike, koje su bile poražene – bilo u Drugom svjetskom ratu ili kasnije, s krajem Hladnog rata (1989.). Čak i one zemlje koje su bile i jesu za europske prilike velike a u globalnim okolnostima srednje velike – doživjele su dramatične poraze, gubitke teritorija i kolonija, stigmatizaciju i izvanjska

ograničenja suvereniteta. One su stoga ispravno zaključile da apsolutna suverenost takvih zemalja nije ni moguća ni poželjna. Formirale su svoj benevolentni demokratski „imperij“ kako bi postale – kroz Europsku uniju – globalno značajne zemlje. Ako žele to ostati, moraju očuvati i razvijati, jačati i popularizirati, Europsku uniju.

Europska unija postala je nakon 1989. politički i ekonomski hegemon europskog kontinenta. Ona je omogućila „rehabilitaciju“ prethodno poraženih zemalja, kao i konsolidaciju onih koji su nezavisnost stekli nakon 1990. Odlučila se da to učini kroz kombiniranje liberalno vođene domaće politike i realistički vođene ideje ostvarenja vlastitih interesa. Sastavni dio toga je politika interveniranja u zemlje-kandidatkinje kako bi one postale konstruktivni akteri u cjelini Unije. Proces europeizacije i proširenja Unije na zemlje neposrednog istočnog susjedstva bio je u skladu s liberalnom politikom „demokratskog mira“, te s konceptom „liberalnog intervencionizma“. Danas se taj liberalni intervencionizam suočava s „iliberanim“, „antidemokratskim“ intervencionizmom Europi susjednih (ili čak s njom polupovezanih) velikih sila: SAD i Rusije. Premda su obje te zemlje odigrale presudnu ulogu (zajedno s Ujedinjenim Kraljevstvom) u oslobađanju Europe od fašizma i nacizma, one su danas odbacile politiku prijateljstva s Europskom unijom i predstavljaju joj prijetnju. Time su dovele u pitanje i koncept euroatlantizma i koncept euroazijstva. Dok je prema Rusiji Europa uvijek imala skeptičan stav, prema SAD-u je imala iluzije kojih se danas oslobađa, prije svega kroz Macronovu politiku „strateške autonomije“. Ta se politika danas vodi pod neizgovorenim ali sveprisutnim sloganom „Europa Europljanima“.

U tom kontekstu, ciljevi Europske unije trebaju ostati sljedeći: 1) očuvanje mira na europskom kontinentu; 2) održanje postojećih i razvijanje novih institucija Europske unije, što uključuje i efikasnije odlučivanje, vjerojatno kroz

odbacivanje načela jednoglasnosti koje daje preveliku moć potencijalnim veto akterima od kojih bi neki možda mogli postati proxy akteri jedne od izvanjskih velikih sila; 3) jačanje samoobrambenih sigurnosnih mreža unutar EU – što znači i napuštanje ideje intervencionizma izvan Unije, čak i kad je ono „humanitarno“ ili „liberalno“; 4) jačanje ekonomske moći Unije kroz pragmatična povezivanja s ekonomijama koje jačaju – npr. Indija i Kina, te zemlje Golfskog zaljeva; 5) očuvanje i jačanje demokratskog karaktera svih zemalja Europske unije, kroz aktivniji otpor pokušajima de-demokratizacije, kako bi Europa postala – ako mora – „tvrđava demokratskih vrijednosti“; te 6) povećanje i strateško razvijanje „meke moći“ odnosno atraktivnosti europskog modela vladavine, čime bi on postao potencijalan uzor (role-model) drugima. Europa može i mora surađivati sa svima koji su orijentirani ka miru, koji se plaše svjetskih ratova, a naročito s onima koji razvijaju slične modele vladavine, zasnovane na poštivanju i proširenju ljudskih prava, ljudske sigurnosti (human security) i neprolaznih vrijednosti prosvjetiteljstva, koje su danas ugrožene.

Multipolarnost odgovara Europskoj uniji više nego unipolarnost i bipolarnost, jer u tom okviru ona može ostati – ili možda: postati – značajan globalni akter, što mora biti jedan od njenih ciljeva. Atraktivnost Europe za druge – bilo na europskom kontinentu ili izvan njega – jest upravo u tome što je EU danas jedini veliki globalni akter koji je neupitno demokratski. Ona na tome može graditi svoju iznimnost, te postati još privlačnija svima izvan nje.

Kad se radi o Zapadnom Balkanu, važno je da i EU i zemlje koje se nalaze u toj regiji shvate i prihvate da je on dio Europe. Pojam Zapadni Balkan nastao je 1997. godine, ali od samog početka Zapadni Balkan nije zamišljen kao trajna nego kao privremena regija. Zamišljen je kao čekaonica za članstvo u Europskoj uniji, a ne kao čekaonica Godota koji nikad neće doći. Te zemlje su ekonomski, sigurnosno i politički

oslonjene na Europsku uniju, koja treba prestati oklijevati u vezi s njihovim prijemom u članstvo. Već su predugo čekale, a u tom čekanju su postale manje demokratske, više autoritarne, manje razvijene, više korumpirane, manje europske a više zbunjene, dok su neke čak i flertovale s ostalim akterima, kao što su Rusija, Kina i SAD. Te zemlje moraju što prije postati članice Europske unije, kolikogod danas bile udaljenije od standarda koji su potrebni za članstvo u odnosu na prije 20 godina. Tada je propuštena prilika, koju se danas ne smije propustiti. Rizici od njihovog ostanka izvan Unije su daleko veći od rizika njihovog prijema u Uniju. Zapadni Balkan je bio poput šatora, privremenog smještaja nakon razornog zemljotresa kojeg su doživjele raspadom prethodnog globalnog poretka (1989.). Šator je dobrodošao kao privremeno, ali ne kao trajno rješenje. Ako ostanu izvan Unije, u njima će se povećavati otpor Europi, rast će frustriranost zbog neprihvaćenosti i nerazumijevanja – što će koristiti protivnicima Europe a ne Europi. Samo se unutar Unije mogu razvijati kao europske zemlje, demokratske, okrenute miru i suradnji, spremne da daju svoj doprinos ukupnoj sigurnosti europskog kontinenta.

Hrvatska je danas dobar primjer integriranosti u Europsku uniju. No, ta se integriranost mora odraziti i na njenu politiku prema proširenju Unije na zemlje Zapadnog Balkana. Snažna i cjelovita Europska unija je u njenom interesu, čak i kad se čini da se zbog tog cilja mora odreći nekih od svojih specifičnih interesa prema pojedinoj zemlji u neposrednom susjedstvu. Ne treba zbog kilograma mesa ubiti vola – pa tako ni zbog etnički vođene vanjske politike ne treba ugroziti interese Europske unije kroz prijetnje vetom ili identitetski ili povijesno inspiriranim uvjetovanjima članstva za te zemlje. Logično je da svaka zemlja, pa i Hrvatska, vodi računa o svojim specifičnim interesima. Ali, nema većeg interesa za malu zemlju u Europi od jačanja Europske unije. A i kad se radi o tim specifičnim interesima, oni će biti bolje

zaštićeni i implementirani ako se uklone tvrde granice između Unije i drugih zemalja – granice koje Hrvatska danas čuva, a koje dijele čak i hrvatski narod, od kojeg značajan dio živi izvan Europske unije. Čak i s pozicije sebičnog nacionalizma, koji u Hrvatskoj nije slab, ulazak Bosne i Hercegovine, Crne Gore i Srbije bi bio u interesu same Hrvatske.

Svijet je danas u previranju – a neki njegovi dijelovi su u ratu. Teško je sa sigurnošću reći kakav će biti nakon tih ratova, nakon neizvjesnosti i nesigurnosti koju danas svi osjećamo. Ali, to ne znači da ne trebamo imati viziju koja razlikuje poželjno od nepoželjnog, prihvatljivo od opasnog i korisno od štetnog. Izmicanje u odnosu na ta pitanja – na pitanja vizije budućeg svijeta – izgleda ponekad kao najbolja opcija. U teoriji vanjske politike ta se opcija naziva šutljivost (quietism). Ali: kakvog smisla imaju države koje žele biti nevidljive i koje ne žele sudjelovati u oblikovanju svijeta? Oni koji ne žele sudjelovati ne mogu se kasnije žaliti da je stvoren svijet kojeg nisu htjeli.



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